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Individual Investor Sentiment and Stock Returns 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates a unique dataset that enables us to determine the aggregate buy 
and sell volume of individual investors for a large cross-section of NYSE stocks. We find 
that individuals trade as if they are contrarians, and that the stocks that individuals buy 
exhibit positive excess returns in the following month. These patterns are consistent with 
the idea that risk-averse individuals provide liquidity to meet institutional demand for 
immediacy. We further examine the relation between individual investor sentiment and 
short-horizon (weekly) return reversals that have been documented in the literature. Our 
results reveal that individual investor sentiment predicts future returns, and that the 
information content of investor sentiment is distinct from that of past returns or past 
volume. Furthermore, the trading of individuals predicts weekly returns in the post-2000 
era for stocks of all sizes, while past return seems to have lost its predictive power for all 
but small stocks over the same time period. Lastly, we note that there is very little cross-
sectional correlation of our individual sentiment measure across the stocks in our sample.  
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1. Introduction 
For a variety of reasons, financial economists tend to view individuals and institutions 
differently.  Institutions are generally much larger, more sophisticated, and are believed 
to be better informed than individual investors.  Individuals, on the other hand, are said to 
have psychological biases and are often thought of as the proverbial noise traders in the 
sense of Kyle (1985) or Black (1986).  
This study examines the investment choices of individual investors with a unique 
dataset that was provided to us by the NYSE. For each stock on each day, we have the 
aggregated volume of executed buy and sell orders of individuals. The dataset was 
constructed from the NYSE's Consolidated Equity Audit Trail Data (CAUD) files that 
contain detailed information on all orders that execute on the exchange. This data allows 
us to construct a daily measure of individual investor sentiment for each stock by 
subtracting the sell volume of individuals from their buy volume and dividing by the 
average daily volume of the stock.  
Our paper focuses on the dynamic relation between individual investor sentiment 
and returns over relatively short horizons (e.g., weekly and monthly). The results suggest 
that individuals tend to be contrarians, at least in the short-run. The mean market-adjusted 
returns in the 20 days prior to a week of intense individual selling is 3.97%, while prior to 
a week of intense individual buying it is −2.54%.1  We also examine the extent to which 
the accumulation of shares by individuals predicts future returns and find that stocks 
experience excess returns of 1.40% in the 20 days following a week of intense buying by 
individuals. However, we find no significant return pattern following a week of intense 
individual selling. 
                                                 
1 In contrast, there are a number of studies suggesting that institutions tend to be momentum traders (e.g., 
Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers, 1995; Nofsinger and Sias, 1999; Wermers, 1999; Sias, 2003; Sias, Starks, 
and Titman, 2003).   
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Our paper is part of a growing literature on individual investors. Because of data 
availability, there are a number of studies that examine non-U.S. data sets, and these 
studies also find that individuals exhibit contrarian investment choices.  For example, 
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) find evidence of contrarian choices in a study of Finish 
individuals, Choe, Kho, and Stulz (1999) find similar results using Korean data, and 
Jackson (2003) has similar findings in a study of Australian individuals. Goetzmann and 
Massa (2002) examine the accounts of individual investors in a fund that follows the 
S&P500 index and find that countrarian outnumber momentum traders two to one. In the 
only other study of U.S. individual investors that we are aware of that addresses these 
issues, Odean (1998, 1999) finds that those who trade using one of the major U.S. 
discount brokers tend to hold on to their losers and sell their winners, which is somewhat 
different but consistent with the idea that individuals are contrarians.    
Many of the above studies also examine the investment performance of individual 
investors and, in contrast to our evidence, most find that individuals do poorly. In 
particular, Odean (1998) and Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000), looking at longer horizons, 
find that individual investors make poor investment choices.  Like us, Odean studies U.S. 
stocks, but the broker that provides his data executes most of its trades off the NYSE, so 
his sample does not overlap with ours. Barber, Lee, Liu, and Odean (2004a) examine the 
performance of individuals in Taiwan, and find losses at short as well as long horizons.2 
Our results also contrast with Griffin, Harris, and Topaloglu (2003), who find no 
significant relation between the trading imbalances of individuals and the future daily 
returns of NASDAQ stocks, and with Barber, Odean, and Zhu (2003), who find that 
stocks bought by clients of two U.S. brokerage firms do not reliably underperform or 
                                                 
2 The behavior of individuals in Taiwan seems to be somewhat different from the behavior of their U.S. 
counterparts. Many individuals in Taiwan engage in active trading (including day trading, see Barber, Lee, 
Liu, and Odean (2004b)), and annual turnover on the Taiwan Stock Exchange averaged 292% over their 
sample period (1995-1999), compared with 69% on the NYSE.   
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overperform the stocks they sold.3 However, our findings are similar to the Australian 
evidence in Jackson (2003), who suggests that individuals perform well over shorter 
horizons.   
Our evidence, which contrasts with previous U.S. findings, is consistent with the 
idea that the contrarian tendency of individuals leads them to act as liquidity providers to 
other investors (e.g., institutions) which require immediacy.  Following Stoll (1978), 
Grossman and Miller (1988), and Campbell, Grossman, and Wang (1993), one can argue 
that investors who require immediacy must offer price concessions to induce risk-averse 
individuals to take the other side of their trades, and that this, in turn, results in 
subsequent return reversals. These return reversals show up as short horizon excess 
returns following concentrated individual buying. Hence, over short intervals, individuals 
may outperform institutions, even when they are at an information disadvantage.4  
To further explore the role of individual investors as liquidity providers, we 
examine how our results relate to the short-horizon return reversals observed by 
Jegadeesh (1990) and Lehmann (1990).  In theory, these reversals can be due to either 
investor overreaction or to illiquidity.5  To distinguish between these alternatives, 
Subrahmanyam (2003) constructs a model in which a liquidity explanation requires past 
order flow to be a predictor of future returns together with past returns.6 Subrahmanyam 
                                                 
3 It is possible that Griffin et al. found no significant relation between individual orders and future returns 
because of a limitation of their dataset.  Since they do not directly identify trades as coming from 
individuals, Griffin et al. categorize brokerage firms as predominantly serving either individuals or 
institutions, and treat all trades coming from a single brokerage firm as if they belong to a single investor 
type. This procedure may introduce noise into the analysis that may mask the predictability result. It is also 
possible that the predictability we find is more prevalent in NYSE stocks than in NASDAQ stocks.   
4 It is interesting to note that while Barber, Lee, Liu, and Odean (2004a) find that Taiwanese individuals on 
average lose when trading, they also find that individuals gain from liquidity providing trades at short 
horizons (10 and 25 days). 
5 Jegadeesh (1990) and Lehmann (1990) both discuss the possibility of overreaction.  Lehmann (1990) also 
suggests that frictions in liquidity provision may explain the weekly reversals and Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1995), who examine the relation between return reversals and bid-ask spreads, provide evidence that is 
consistent with a liquidity explanation for daily reversals.   
6 Mase (1999) considers similar issues in a study of U.K. stocks and concludes that the evidence supports 
overreaction. 
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tests his model using monthly returns and net trade imbalances signed using the Lee and 
Ready (1991) algorithm as a proxy for order flow. He finds no significant relation 
between returns and his measure of past order flow imbalance, concluding that the results 
do not support the notion that the provision of liquidity by risk-averse agents drives the 
reversals.  
Subrahmanyam’s (2003) tests use a measure of order flow that aggregates 
inferred market orders of everyone in the market rather than focusing specifically on the 
trading of liquidity providers. Our tests, in contrast, consider the possibility that since 
individuals act as contrarians, they effectively provide liquidity, irrespective of whether 
they trade using limit or market orders.7  If this is indeed the case, then the trading of 
individuals may provide a better proxy for the relevant order flow variable than the 
market-wide variable used by Subrahmanyam.  Our empirical tests suggest that this may 
in fact be the case. 
 In addition to examining how individual sentiment relates to these return 
reversals, we also look at the interplay between trading volume, investor sentiment, and 
returns.   Our analysis is thus related to the literature documenting that volume contains 
information that is useful in predicting short-horizon returns (Conrad, Hameed, and 
Niden, 1994; Gervais, Kaniel, and Mingelgrin, 2001; Llorente, Michaely, Saar, and 
Wang, 2002). This literature postulates that volume arises from shocks to investor 
hedging needs, private information, or trader interest in a given stock. Since such shocks 
can give rise to a demand for immediacy by institutions and liquidity provision by 
                                                 
7 The Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm used by Subrahmanyam tries to establish which party to a trade used 
a market order (by comparing the transaction price to the quote midpoint), and classifies that party as a 
liquidity demander. Our measure allows for other possibilities. For example, institutions that want to move 
large positions could use dynamic limit order strategies and therefore their demand for immediacy would 
be accommodated by the individuals’ market orders. Since we focus on the identity of the trader rather than 
the order type, we allow for a somewhat broader interpretation of liquidity provision with respect to order 
type.  
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individuals, it is possible that volume and individual investor sentiment in fact contain the 
same information about future returns.   
To examine how liquidity provision by individuals relates to these return and 
volume patterns we run multivariate regressions of weekly returns on past returns, 
volume, and investor sentiment. The results of these regressions indicate that individual 
investor sentiment is a powerful predictor of future returns that is not subsumed by either 
past returns or past volume.  We also examine the predictive effect of individual 
sentiment, past returns, and volume by sorting stocks into portfolios.  The returns of 
portfolios constructed from independent sorts by individual sentiment and past volume 
indicate that both variables predict returns.  In addition, the relation between individual 
sentiment and returns remains significant in portfolios sorted by past returns and 
individual sentiment.  However, in these latter sorts, there is no evidence of an 
independent past returns effect.  In other words, individual sentiment seems to subsume 
the past returns effect. 
Finally, we look at the question of whether individual investor sentiment is 
“systematic.” Our analysis is motivated by claims in the behavioral finance literature that 
if fluctuations in noise trader sentiment affect many assets, then the risk they create 
cannot be diversified and will be priced in equilibrium. We conduct a principal 
component analysis of the individual investor sentiment and find very little correlated 
actions of individuals across stocks: the first principal component of the sentiment 
explains only 1.33% of the variance over and above a simulated benchmark created from 
independent data. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the sample 
and the unique dataset we use. Section 3 presents analysis of the dynamic relation 
between our measure of investor sentiment and returns. The investigation of short-
horizon return predictability and its relation to investor sentiment is carried out in Section 
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4. Section 5 looks at whether the actions of individuals are correlated across stocks, and 
Section 6 concludes.   
 
2. Data and Sample 
We study the trading of individuals using a special dataset that was provided to us by the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). The dataset was constructed from the NYSE's 
Consolidated Equity Audit Trail Data (CAUD) files that contain detailed information on 
all orders that execute on the exchange, both electronic and manual (those handled by 
floor brokers). One of the fields associated with each order, called Account Type, 
specifies whether the order originated from an individual investor.  
The Account Type designation of individual investor orders has its origins in the 
aftermath of October 1987. The NYSE introduced the Individual Investor Express 
Delivery Service that provides priority delivery of orders up to 2,099 shares that have 
been identified as individual investor orders.8 The goal of the service is to ensure that 
individual investors are not disadvantaged relative to professional investors in periods of 
extreme market conditions. In order to implement the system, new Account Type 
categories that identify individual investors were created in October 1988, and orders 
coming from individual investors are now marked as such by their brokers (Account 
Type is a mandatory field a broker has to fill for each order that is sent to the NYSE).  
The Account Type field is not audited by the NYSE on an order-by-order basis. It 
is reasonable to assume, however, that individual investor orders are marked as such 
because designating an order as coming from an individual investor has some advantages. 
At the same time, NYSE officials monitor the use of this field by brokers. Any abnormal 
use of the individual investor designation in the Account Type field by a brokerage firm 
                                                 
8 The service is activated when the Dow Jones Industrial Average moves more than a certain amount up or 
down from the previous day's close. When the Individual Investor Express Delivery Service was introduced 
in October 1988, the threshold was a 25-point move from the previous day’s close.   
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is likely to draw attention, which prevents abuse of the system. We therefore believe that 
the Account Type designation of individual investor orders is fairly accurate. 
Our sample contains all common, domestic stocks that were traded on the NYSE 
any time between January 1, 2000 and December 31, 2002.9 We use the CRSP database 
to construct the sample, and match the stocks to the NYSE dataset by means of ticker 
symbol and CUSIP. This procedure results in a sample of 1,920 stocks. For each stock on 
each day, we have the aggregated volume of executed buy and sell orders of individuals. 
An important advantage of this dataset is that it contains information on executed orders, 
rather than trades, and therefore we are able to determine unambiguously whether an 
individual buys or sells shares. In other words, the classification into buy and sell volume 
in our dataset is exact, and we do not have to rely on classification algorithms such as the 
one proposed by Lee and Ready (1991). Table 1 presents summary statistics for the entire 
sample and for three size groups.10  
We should note that some brokers either sell some of their order flow (in NYSE-
listed stocks) to wholesalers for execution or internalize a certain portion of their clients’ 
orders by trading as principal against them. Since such pre-arranged trading practices 
cannot be carried out on the NYSE, these trades take place on one of the regional 
exchanges (or alternatively reported to the NASD) and are therefore not in our sample of 
NYSE executions. For example, Schwab internalized 66% of its orders in the fourth 
quarter of 2003, while Fidelity sent about 38% of its volume in NYSE-listed stocks to the 
Boston Stock Exchange to be executed by its own specialist.11 However, it is very likely 
that the fraction of volume these brokers send to the NYSE consists of orders that create 
                                                 
9 The NYSE does not store CAUD data for the period prior to January 2000. 
10 To construct the size groups, we sort the stocks in the sample according to average market capitalization 
over the sample period and form ten deciles. Small stocks are defined as those in deciles 1, 2, 3, and 4. 
Mid-cap stocks are those in deciles 5, 6, and 7, while large stocks are those in deciles 8, 9, and 10. 
11 These figures are taken from an article by Kate Kelly in the Wall Street Journal (“SEC Overhaul Could 
Topple Best-Price Rule,” March 5, 2004). 
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an imbalance not easily matched internally. This means that imbalances in the orders of 
individuals find their way to the NYSE even if some of the more balanced individual 
volume is executed elsewhere. Therefore, our investor sentiment measure (detailed 
below) that captures the net trading of individuals probably reflects imbalances in the 
market as a whole.  
We construct a daily measure of investor sentiment by subtracting the value of the 
shares sold by individuals from the value of shares bought, and standardize the measure 
by the average daily dollar volume in the calendar year. Specifically, we define Net 
Investor Sentiment (NIS) for stock i on day t as: 
i,t i,t
,
i,year {2000,2001,2002 : t year}
Individual buy dollar volume Individual sell dollar volume
Average daily dollar volume in calendar yeari t
NIS
∈ ∈
−=  
Since our goal is to identify periods in which individuals are accumulating or selling an 
unusual amount of shares, we use in our analysis the deviations of this measure from its 
mean. In other words, we define ANISi,t (Abnormal NISi,t) as NISi,t minus the average of 
NISi over the sample period.  
  
3. Dynamic Relation between Investor Sentiment and Returns 
In this section we examine the relation between individual investor sentiment and returns.  
In the first subsection we examine the extent to which our sentiment measure is related to 
past returns, as well as its ability to forecast future returns.  In the second subsection we 
examine how our sentiment measure relates to volatility. 
 
3.1 Investor Sentiment and Returns 
We start by aggregating daily investor sentiment to create a weekly ANIS measure and 
identify those weeks where either positive or negative ANIS is the most pronounced.  
This is done by comparing each stock’s ANIS value in a given week (the formation 
week) with the values of ANIS in the previous 9 weeks, and placing the stocks in decile 
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portfolios. In other words, decile 1 contains stocks for which ANIS in the formation week 
is more negative than the stocks’ own ANIS in the previous 9 weeks. We call this decile 
the “intense selling portfolio.” Similarly, decile 10 contains stocks with the most positive 
ANIS relative to the previous 9 weeks, and we call this decile the “intense buying 
portfolio.”  For robustness, we also look at the results for somewhat less intense trading 
by forming a selling portfolio from the stocks in deciles 1 and 2, and a buying portfolio 
from the stocks in deciles 9 and 10.  
Panel A of Table 2 presents the cumulative market-adjusted returns for these four 
individual investor sentiment portfolios.12  These cumulative returns are calculated for 
20, 15, 10 and 5 days before the first day or after the last day of the formation week.  The 
cells in the table contain the time-series means and t-statistics for each of the cumulative 
return measures CR(k). The first line of Panel A shows that intense individual selling 
(decile 1) follows an increase in the prices of stocks. The mean excess return in the 20 
days prior to the selling week is 3.97%, and the mean excess return in the five days prior 
to that week is 1.92%. These returns are highly statistically significant.  The last line of 
the panel describes the returns in the week prior to intense individual buying activity 
(decile 10). The excess return in the 20 days prior to intense buying is –2.54%, and is 
highly statistically significant. We get similar results with the less extreme portfolios 
(deciles 1 and 2 for selling, and deciles 9 and 10 for buying), suggesting that our findings 
are not driven by outliers.  
The results in Panel A of Table 2 indicate that U.S. individual investors can be 
characterized as contrarians, which is consistent with the findings regarding individual 
investors in Australia, Finland and Korea.  As we mentioned in the introduction, one 
interpretation of these results is that individuals effectively provide liquidity to 
                                                 
12 We use the value-weighted portfolio of all stocks in the sample as a proxy for the market portfolio.  
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institutions, selling shares when the buying pressure from institutions pushes prices up 
and buying shares when the selling pressure from institutions pushes prices down.   
The table also provides evidence on returns following intense individual buying 
and selling activity.  We observe positive excess returns following weeks in which 
individuals accumulate an unusual number of shares. The portfolio of stocks in decile 10 
earns 0.33% market-adjusted returns in the week after the intense buying and 1.40% in 
the 20 days following portfolio formation (both statistically significant). On the other 
hand, market-adjusted returns following intense selling by individuals are not 
significantly different from zero.13 
These results should be contrasted with the common characterization of individual 
investors as “noise” traders who lose money on average.  Indeed, the evidence is 
consistent with the hypothesis that individuals who trade on the NYSE tend to at least 
implicitly react to the liquidity needs of institutions, and at least in the short run, earn 
abnormal returns by exploiting their counterparties demand for immediacy.  While the 
effect should be symmetric in the sense that liquidity provision should be profitable for 
individuals both when they buy and when they sell, the information content of 
institutional trading may also affect the pattern of returns we observe. Institutional buying 
activity is more likely to be motivated by information then their selling activity (see Saar, 
2001, and references therein), which may explain why individuals fail to profit when they 
take the other side of institutional buys. 
If the excess returns individuals earn when buying represent compensation for 
providing liquidity to institutional sellers, we should expect to find higher compensation 
(larger excess returns) when individuals buy less liquid stocks. We use the percentage 
effective spread (the distance from the transaction price to the quote midpoint divided by 
                                                 
13 We also looked at whether such dynamic relations (contrarian patterns and predictability) exist between 
the value-weighted market return and a value-weighted measure of the individual investor sentiment, but no 
statistically significant patterns were found. 
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the quote midpoint) as a proxy for the liquidity of a stock.14 The larger the effective 
spread, the greater the price movement on trades and therefore the less liquid the stock. In 
Panel B of Table 2 we sort stocks each week according to the average percentage 
effective spread and put them into three groups: small, medium, and large.15 We then 
form the intense buying portfolio of individuals (decile 10) separately for each spread 
group. We observe that individuals realize greater excess returns when buying less liquid 
stocks: 0.9% in the 20 days following portfolio formation in the small spread group, 
1.53% in the medium spread group, and 1.87% in the large spread group. These results 
are consistent with the hypothesis that individuals generate excess returns by 
accommodating the liquidity needs of institutions. 
While these findings of return predictability can be interpreted as evidence of 
market inefficiency, they are at least qualitatively consistent with what we would expect 
if individuals provide liquidity to the market and profit from their service.  Of course, one 
could argue that the magnitude of the profits associated with these trades suggest that the 
compensation for liquidity provision is too high.  However, it should be noted that a 
strategy designed to exploit this presumed inefficiency would be quite transaction-
intensive and entail taking on some risk.16 
We performed additional analyses to examine the robustness of our findings to the 
methodology we employ. The reason we adopted the methodology of forming deciles by 
comparing a stock’s ANIS in the formation week to its own past ANIS was because the 
                                                 
14 The bid and ask prices are taken from the TAQ data base. 
15 Our weekly sorting into spread groups has the advantage that a stock may be classified not just according 
to its average liquidity properties but also according to the state of liquidity of the stock on that week. For 
example, a stock will be classified as low liquidity if its effective spread is larger due to worsened liquidity 
on that week even if normally it has a lower effective spread and on other weeks it is in the medium or 
small spread groups.  
16 We should also note that Account Type information identifying the orders of individual investors cannot 
be used to implement a trading strategy in real time because it is not publicly available. In fact, Account 
Type information is not available even to the specialists who oversee trading on the NYSE floor, but rather 
is collected in the CAUD files for regulatory purposes.  
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impact of trading imbalances on future prices is likely to be related to the stock’s ability 
to absorb order flow. Subrahmanyam (2003) makes a similar point stating that inventory 
control effects (that create the return reversals) predict a downward pressure on the price 
of a stock in the absolute sense, not a relative (cross-sectional) sense. Our methodology, 
similar in spirit to the methodology in Gervais, Kaniel, and Mingelgrin (2001), has the 
advantage that it uses a moving average of nine weeks and therefore is robust to a 
potential trend in the measure.17 
Nonetheless, to verify that these results are not driven by the manner in which we 
form the ANIS deciles, we also used a cross-sectional sorting procedure where each week 
all stocks are sorted on ANIS (relative to each other) and grouped into ten deciles. We 
then repeated the analysis for the four portfolios of individual buying and selling as in 
Table 2. The results were similar, and both contrarian tendencies and the return 
predictability on buying were statistically significant.  
We also examined the robustness of our results to different definitions of excess 
returns. Specifically, we repeated the analysis with excess returns from a market model 
regression, with industry-adjusted returns and with raw returns.18 The results were similar 
with all return definitions, and both the contrarian pattern and return predictability results 
were statistically significant.   
 
3.2 Investor sentiment and volatility 
Another potential explanation for the excess returns following individual buys is that 
individuals systematically buy stocks when they become riskier.  Perhaps, institutions are 
                                                 
17 The methodology also does not use any future information in the classification in order to make sure that 
the effects we document can be viewed in terms of return predictability. Note that despite the fact that 
ANIS is normalized by the average dollar volume in a calendar year, when we compare it to past weeks, the 
denominator is the same and the comparison is done only by considering the numerator that consists of the 
weekly volume imbalance. 
18 We used a classification into ten industry portfolios (based on four-digit SIC codes) made available by 
Kenneth French. The exact specification of the ten industry portfolios can be obtained from:  
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/det_10_ind_port.html 
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either more risk averse, or perhaps more savvy, and thus choose to sell their shares when 
they have information that suggests that the risk of a stock is increasing. It has also been 
suggested that the activities of individual investors, i.e., the noise traders in the 
behavioral finance literature, make stocks more volatile or riskier.19  
We cannot reject such interpretations off hand, as both the beta and the weekly 
standard deviation of returns of the individuals’ buying portfolio are higher than those of 
their selling portfolio.20 However, this observation may simply be an artifact of transitory 
changes in volatility around intense trading by individuals due to the price pressure and 
return reversals that are associated with liquidity provision; As such these would not 
represent fundamental differences in the risk attributes of stocks individuals buy as 
opposed to those they sell.  
To examine in more detail volatility patterns around intense trading by individuals 
we follow the same basic procedures that generated the numbers in Table 2, but calculate 
volatility rather than mean returns. We compute for each stock in each of the four 
portfolios the standard deviation of daily returns in 9-day windows centered on k = –20, –
15, –10, –5, 0, +5, +10, +15, and +20 days (where day 0 is the middle of the formation 
week). Since we are interested in abnormal volatility around intense investor activity, we 
subtract from these numbers the “normal” 9-day return standard deviation (which we 
compute as the average of daily return standard deviations on all non-overlapping 9-day 
windows in the sample period). Table 3, which presents the cross-sectional mean of these 
abnormal volatility measures in each ANIS portfolio, tells us how volatility of returns 
evolves around the trading of individuals. 
                                                 
19 See, for example, De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990a) and Shleifer and Summers 
(1990).  
20 The beta of the intense buying portfolio is 0.1027 higher than the beta of the intense selling portfolio and 
the standard deviation of the intense buying portfolio is 0.0033 higher than the standard deviation of the 
intense selling portfolio.   
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A clear pattern emerges from the table: volatility increases prior to intense 
individual activity and subsequently decreases. Take for example the volatility of returns 
around intense individual selling (first line of the table, going across the columns): it is 
exactly at the level of the average volatility at k = –20, then increases to 0.0014 above 
average volatility at k = –5, reaches 0.0021 at k = 0, and then decreases to –0.0008 by k = 
+20. The next two columns test the increase of volatility from k = –20 to k = 0, which is 
0.0021 and statistically significant, and the decrease of –0.0029 from k = 0 to k = +20, 
again statistically significant. The last column of the table tests the more “permanent” 
change in volatility, from k = –20 to k = +20, and finds no significant change. An even 
greater increase in volatility (0.0038) is observed from –20 to 0 before intense buying 
activity (decile 10), and most of it is subsequently reversed (–0.0026) from 0 to +20. 
Therefore, it seems that the increase in volatility we observe is temporary in nature and 
disappears after the abnormal trading period.  
 
4. Short-Horizon (Weekly) Predictability of Returns 
In this section, we examine how our evidence relates to the Jegadeesh (1990) and 
Lehmann (1990) evidence on short-horizon return reversals.  Given that individuals tend 
to be contrarians, it is possible that the short-horizon excess returns associated with 
individual buys simply reflect the Jegadeesh and Lehmann return reversals.  
Alternatively, if the return reversals reflect what Lehmann (1990) characterizes as 
inefficiencies in the market for short-term liquidity, it is possible that the imbalances in 
individual buying and selling can explain the return reversals.21 In this section’s first 
subsection we examine how the ANIS effect interacts with both the return reversal effect 
and the turnover effect previously documented by Gervais, Kaniel, and Mingelgrin 
(2001).  In the second subsection we examine the return reversal effect over previous 
                                                 
21 Jegadeesh and Titman (1995) provides evidence that indicates that the daily return reversals exist mainly 
in relatively illiquid stocks.  
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time periods to provide some evidence on the extent to which the phenomenon we 
examine is stable over time. 
 
4.1 The Relation between ANIS, Turnover, and Returns 
To examine this issue, stocks are sorted each week into five quintiles of weekly returns, 
where quintile 1 (5) contains the stocks with the most negative (positive) return. Each 
week stocks are also put into five ANIS quintiles according to the value of ANIS that 
week relative to the values of ANIS of that same stock in the previous nine weeks (as in 
Section 3). Quintile 1 contains stocks with the most negative ANIS, or net selling, while 
quintile 5 contains stocks with the most positive ANIS, or net buying. Then, 25 portfolios 
are formed as the intersection of the five return quintiles and the five ANIS quintiles. For 
each of the portfolios we compute the market-adjusted return in the week following the 
formation week.22  
Panel A of Table 4 focuses on the sentiment of individual investors and reports 
the time-series averages of the weekly market-adjusted returns for the 25 portfolios. 
Looking across the columns of the different return quintiles, no simple pattern of return 
reversal can be found. Take, for example, the row of ANIS quintile 1 (individual selling). 
The market-adjusted return in the subsequent week for return quintile 1 (most negative 
current week return) is –0.26%, for return quintile 3 it is −0.13%, and for return quintile 5 
it is –0.25%. Similarly, in the row of ANIS quintile 5, both quintile 1 and quintile 5 of 
return are positive (i.e., a reversal after negative returns but a continuation after positive 
returns). The last two columns of the table look at the payoffs to a trading strategy that 
buys quintile 5 and sells quintile 1. If the return reversal strategy that buys the portfolio 
with last week’s most negative return and sells the one with last week’s most positive 
                                                 
22 We examined the robustness of our findings to different definitions of returns by repeating the analysis 
using raw returns, market-model-adjusted returns, and industry-adjusted returns (as in Section 3.1). Our 
conclusions from all these return definitions were the same. 
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return can be used to generate profits, the payoffs in the column Q5 – Q1 should be 
negative and significant. The table shows that the payoffs to this strategy are not 
statistically different from zero in any of the ANIS quintiles.23  
On the other hand, there is a pronounced pattern within each quintile of past 
returns going from past individual selling (ANIS quintile 1) to past individual buying 
(ANIS quintile 5). The market-adjusted return in each column of the table becomes more 
positive as we go from the stocks that individuals sold the previous week to those 
individuals bought. For example, the market-adjusted return in the following week in the 
column of return quintile 1 is –0.26% for ANIS quintile 1, 0.03% for ANIS quintile 3, 
and 0.41% for ANIS quintile 5. The bottom two lines of the panel provide information 
about the payoffs to buying a portfolio that is comprised of stocks that experience more 
intense individual buying in the previous week (ANIS quintile 5) and selling those stocks 
experiencing intense individual selling (ANIS quintile 1) in each return quintile. All these 
portfolios realize statistically significant positive payoffs, ranging from 0.30% to 0.67% 
per week.24  
It is also possible that ANIS contains the same information contained in trading 
volume, which would suggest that our result is a restatement of the findings in Gervais, 
Kaniel, and Mingelgrin (2001) that high returns follow high volume. We therefore repeat 
the analysis sorting the stocks each week into five quintiles of weekly ANIS and five 
quintiles of turnover. The assignment of a stock into a turnover quintile on a given week 
follows the methodology in Gervias et al. and is similar in nature to the way we assign 
stocks each week into ANIS quintiles (the turnover of a stock on a certain week is 
compared to the turnover of the same stock in the previous ten weeks). Based on these 
                                                 
23 We use the Newey-West correction in the computation of the t-statistics. 
24 The payoffs are in terms of percentage of dollar invested in the long position of this zero-investment 
strategy. 
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5X5 sorts, 25 portfolios are formed as the intersection of the five turnover quintiles and 
five ANIS quintiles, and their returns are calculated. 
Panel B of Table 4 reveals that the information in the investor sentiment measure 
is distinct from that in turnover, and both provide independent information about future 
returns. In particular, the strategy of buying the stocks in ANIS quintile 5 and selling the 
stocks in ANIS quintile 1 produces statistically significant payoffs in each turnover 
column, and the strategy of buying the stocks in turnover quintile 5 and selling those in 
turnover quintile 1 generates statistically significant payoffs in each ANIS row.   
The finding that both the sentiment of individual investors and turnover have 
significant ability to predict the subsequent week’s return is especially interesting. 
Gervais, Kaniel, and Mingelgrin (2001) suggest that the high-volume return premium, or 
the tendency of prices to increase after periods with high turnover, is due to shocks in 
trader interest. If high volume attracts investor attention to the stock, the investor 
recognition hypothesis (e.g., Merton, 1987) argues that the stock value would increase 
due to better risk sharing. A reasonable candidate for a class of investors who do not 
follow all the stocks all the time but may be attracted to a certain stock after a volume 
shock brings media attention to it are individual investors. This reasoning suggests that 
conditioning on a variable that specifically measures individual investor sentiment could 
potentially explain the high-volume return premium, leaving no role for turnover. Our 
findings, however, suggest that turnover and ANIS contain different information and 
neither of them subsumes the other.  
To examine turnover, ANIS, and, past returns simultaneously we estimate a series 
of Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions.25  Table 5 presents the estimates of a 
regression of returns in week t on a set of dummy variables that represent week t-1 return 
                                                 
25 Specifically, a cross-sectional regression is performed for each week in the sample period. Then, we 
construct test statistics based on the time-series of the estimated coefficients (using the Newey-West 
correction for the standard errors). 
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quintiles, turnover quintiles, and ANIS quintiles.  The results from these regressions are 
consistent with the findings in the previous table that consider the relation between ANIS, 
turnover, and past returns in two by two sorts.  In particular, we find that ANIS and 
turnover are both strong predictors of future returns in these multiple regressions. After 
controlling for ANIS and turnover, however, past return quintiles provide no information 
about future returns.26 
We also run a Fama-MacBeth regression specification where the current week’s 
return is regressed on past week’s return rather than on dummy variables for past return 
quintiles. We do this for two reasons. First, one could argue that there is some loss of 
information associated with the transformation of returns into quintile dummy variables, 
and that this may bias our tests against finding a past return effect. Second, this 
specification is comparable with past literature (e.g., Jegadeesh, 1990; Subrahmanyam, 
2003) that document a significant past return predictability effect. Table 6 presents the 
results of the regression analysis for the entire sample and for three size groups.  
We first run a univariate regression of the subsequent week’s return on each of the 
three predictive variables: return, ANIS, and turnover. We use a transformation of ANIS 
into decile ranks to be consistent with our analysis in section 3. In other words, each 
stock is put into one of the ten deciles in a certain week according to its ANIS value that 
week relative to the ANIS of that same stock in the previous nine weeks, where decile 1 
(10) contains stocks with the most negative (positive) ANIS. We then use the decile rank 
of each stock on each week (the ANISDecile variable) as an independent variable in the 
                                                 
26 While the Fama-MacBeth t-statistic on the mean coefficient of each of the four past return dummy 
variables is not different from zero, we also wanted to test the joint hypothesis that the coefficients on all 
four dummy variables are equal to zero. Unlike the situation in a regular regression framework where the 
joint hypothesis can be easily tested, the Fama-MacBeth specification does not satisfy the conditions 
necessary for an F-test. We therefore treated each set of coefficients on a single dummy variable (e.g., past 
return of quintile 2) from the cross-sectional regressions as a sample. This created four possibly related 
samples. We then tested the joint hypothesis that the means of the four samples are all equal to zero using a 
Friedman nonparametric test that allows for related samples. The test statistic could not reject the 
hypothesis that the mean coefficients on the dummy variables are different from zero.    
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regressions.27  Similarly, we use a transformation of turnover into decile ranks (as we do 
for ANIS) because Gervais, Kaniel, and Mingelgrin (2001) found such a transformation 
of volume useful in predicting returns.  
In Panel A of Table 6 we use CRSP returns to be consistent with most of the 
papers in the return predictability literature. Looking at the results of the regressions 
using all stocks in the sample, the mean coefficient on past returns is negative and 
statistically significant, consistent with the weekly return reversal that was documented in 
the literature. The mean coefficient on ANISDecile is positive and highly statistically 
significant. Finally, the mean coefficient on TurnoverDecile is positive and highly 
statistically significant, consistent with the high-volume return premium phenomenon. 
Even more interesting is the last model that uses all three explanatory variables 
together. The mean coefficient on past returns decreases slightly in magnitude, from 
−0.0243 in the univariate model to −0.0226 in the multivariate model, and remains 
statistically significant. Both the mean coefficients on ANISDecile and TurnoverDecile 
are very similar in the univariate and multivariate settings and are highly significant. The 
strong showing of both ANISDecile and TurnoverDecile in the multivariate regression 
supports our conclusion from Table 4 and Table 5 that these two variables contain 
different information. These findings suggest that we have identified an important new 
predictor variable with respect to weekly returns—the sentiment of individual investors. 
The results of the regression analysis in Panel A of Table 6 give a somewhat 
different picture of return reversals from the analysis of 25 portfolios in Table 4 and the 
regressions using dummy variables for past return quintiles in Table 5. While it was 
difficult to discern a pattern of predictability along the return dimension in the analysis of 
                                                 
27 For robustness, we also ran the regressions using ANIS, rather then the ANIS decile ranks, as the 
independent variable. This specification is similar in spirit to the cross-sectional robustness tests that we 
conducted in Section 3.1. The results were similar in that the mean coefficient on ANIS was positive and 
statistically significant in all the models (univariate and multivariate). 
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portfolios or return quintiles, here the mean coefficient on past return remains significant 
and does not change much even after ANIS is added as an explanatory variable.  
We wanted to examine the robustness of these results to two issues: bid-ask 
bounce and nonsynchronous trading. Conrad, Gultekin, and Kaul (1997) claim that a 
large portion of the documented weekly return reversal can be explained by bid-ask 
bounce. Lo and MacKinlay (1990) present a framework where non-trading induces 
negative serial correlation in the returns of individual stocks. While their simulations 
show that the impact of non-trading on short-horizon returns of individual stocks is 
negligible, it can still contribute to the significant coefficient that we find on past returns. 
We therefore used the TAQ database to create a return series from end-of-day quote 
midpoints.28 Since the prices used for constructing the return series are the midpoints 
between the bid and the ask, this series completely eliminates the bid-ask bounce 
problem. Also, since the specialist keeps a binding quote in each stock and can change 
the quote even when there is no trading, the quote prevailing at the close of the market 
presumably contains updated pricing information even if the last trade occurred long 
before the close. 
Panel B of Table 6 presents the results of the regressions with the midquote 
returns. In the regressions using all stocks, the mean coefficient on past returns in the 
univariate model is smaller in magnitude than the one in Panel A with the CRSP returns 
(-0.0185 versus -0.0243). In the multivariate model, in the presence of ANIS and 
turnover, the mean coefficient on past returns decreases in magnitude even further and is 
no longer statistically significant. The mean coefficient on ANIS, on the other hand, is 
the same irrespective on whether we are using returns from closing prices or midquotes, 
and is highly statistically significant. Therefore, it seems that the ability of past returns to 
                                                 
28 Since the quality of intraday data in TAQ may not be as high as the quality of the CRSP data, if the 
absolute value of the difference between the TAQ return and the CRSP return is greater than 15%, we set 
the TAQ return to a missing value for the purpose of the regressions. 
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predict future returns no longer exists in the Fama-MacBeth multivariate specification 
when we control for bid-ask bounce and nonsynchronous trading.   
We also report in both panels of Table 6 the results of the regression analysis 
done separately for three groups of stocks: small stocks, mid-cap stocks, and large stocks. 
We sort stocks according to market capitalization into ten deciles, and define deciles 1, 2, 
3, and 4 as small stocks, deciles 5, 6, and 7 as mid-cap stocks, and deciles 8, 9, and 10 as 
large stocks. Significant mean coefficients on ANISDecile and TurnoverDecile are found 
across the three size groups.  However, the coefficient on past returns is reliably different 
than zero only for the small firms. 
 
4.2 A Historical Perspective on Return Reversals 
Since the three-year sample period we consider does not overlap with the sample periods 
examined in the previous studies of weekly return reversals, we use the same 
methodology to examine return reversals over three-year periods starting in 1964. This 
exercise is intended to provide some insight on whether this phenomenon has changed 
over time, and whether the period we study is unusual relative to the time periods 
considered in earlier studies.  
 The results in Table 7 indicate that the return reversal phenomenon has been 
changing.  The second column of Table 7 shows a very clear trend in the estimated mean 
coefficients over the past decade or so since the publication of the work by Lehmann 
(1990) and Jegadeesh (1990) on the predictability of short-horizon returns. While the 
magnitude of the mean coefficient on past return fluctuates throughout the decades, it 
monotonically decreases from the 1988−1990 period (−0.0940) to the 2000−2002 period 
(−0.0243). In fact, the magnitude has been at an all-time low since 1994. The analysis of 
size groups shows that the decline in the magnitude and significance of the mean 
coefficient over the past decade can be found in stocks of all sizes. Since small stocks 
demonstrate a higher degree of weekly return reversal than mid-cap or large stocks, the 
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declining trend still leaves a statistically significant mean coefficient during our sample 
period, 2000−2002. The smaller magnitude of reversals in larger stocks coupled with the 
declining trend over the past decade result in non-significant mean coefficients for the 
mid-cap and large groups in the most recent three-year period. 
Why are we observing such a trend? Perhaps the publication of this potential 
“inefficiency” might have prompted sophisticated traders to take advantage of it and 
eliminate the pattern. The past decade has seen an increase in the activity of proprietary 
trading desks utilizing quantitative strategies that are aimed at taking advantage of 
various price patterns. The growing ability to carry out computerized trading strategies 
together with a decline in trading costs could have brought an end to this inefficiency, if 
it were indeed an inefficiency.  
This raises the question of what could have been (or still is in the case of small 
stocks) the reason for observing this phenomenon. Lehmann (1990) suggests that the 
weekly return reversal is due to inefficiency in the market for liquidity services. Mase 
(1999) concludes that weekly return predictability in the UK is due to irrational trading—
overreaction and a subsequent correction—rather than frictions in the market for 
liquidity. 
More recently, Subrahmanyam (2003) provides a model that captures both 
liquidity provision by risk-averse agents and irrationality in the sense of overconfidence.  
In his framework, reversals due to liquidity provision by risk-averse agents generate a 
relation between expected returns and past order flow while reversals due to 
overconfidence do not. Subrahmanyam tests his model using monthly returns and net 
trade imbalances signed using the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm. He finds no 
significant relation between returns and his order flow measure, concluding that the 
liquidity provision hypothesis is not supported by the data.  
  Our results contrast with those presented by Subrahmanyam in that we find a 
very significant relation between returns and the past order flow imbalance of individual 
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investors in a linear framework similar to the one he implements. The difference can be 
due to our ability to better measure the order flow imbalance of those agents who 
presumably provide liquidity, individuals. Subrahmanyam computes his measure using 
all trades in the market without the ability to focus on one class of investors or the other, 
and he needs to use an algorithm for signing trades that introduces errors into his measure 
while we know the true direction of orders. Another potential explanation for the 
difference is that we examine weekly predictability (due to the short sample period for 
which we obtained data), while he looks at monthly predictability.29  
Our results suggest that liquidity provision may induce short-horizon return 
reversals. Both the effects of investor sentiment and turnover on returns are very 
prominent in recent data. On the other hand, the weekly return predictability using past 
return that was identified and investigated in the literature seems to be disappearing.  
 
5. Is Individual Investor Sentiment Correlated Across Stocks? 
In this section we examine whether individual investor sentiment is systematic in the 
sense that it affects all stocks at the same time. This is important because the behavioral 
finance literature suggests that, if indeed individual investors are “noise” traders, such 
systematic variation in their sentiment would affect expected returns. The argument 
describing our motivation for examining this issue is succinctly made by Lee, Shleifer, 
and Thaler (1991): “If different noise traders traded randomly across assets, the risk their 
sentiment would create would be diversifiable, just as the idiosyncratic fundamental risk 
is diversifiable in conventional pricing models. However, if fluctuations in the same noise 
trader sentiment affect many assets and are correlated across noise traders, then the risk 
                                                 
29 Cooper (1999) finds significant weekly return predictability using past return and volume for large 
stocks, but his sample period ends in 1993. The evidence in Table 7 suggests that it is probably no longer 
possible nowadays to find predictability using past return information in mid-cap and large stocks. 
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that these fluctuations create cannot be diversified. Like fundamental risk, noise trader 
risk will be priced in equilibrium.”  
To examine this question, we conduct a principal component analysis of the 
investor sentiment measure and look at the percentage of variance of ANIS that is 
explained by the first ten principal components.  We construct 1,000 random sub-samples 
of 180 stocks each from among the stocks that have a complete set of daily returns,30 and 
look at the mean and standard deviation of the percentage of variance across the 1,000 
random sub-samples. We use simulations to generate principal components for 
independent random matrices, and use these as a benchmark for evaluating the 
percentage of variance explained by the principal components in the real data (details of 
the methodology are provided in the Appendix).31  
Panel A of Table 8 shows the results of the principal component analysis of the 
individual investor sentiment measure and also of daily returns. The daily return analysis 
is shown to provide a sense of the magnitude of co-movement observed in the cross 
section of stocks. For example, 21.89% of the daily variation in returns of stocks in our 
sample is explained by the first five principal components. However, the third line of the 
panel shows that the percentage of variance explained by the first five principal 
components of the simulated independent data is 5.8%, and therefore the difference 
between these two numbers, roughly 16.09%, is a better measure of the structure in the 
real data. The analysis of ANIS reveals very little evidence of correlated actions of 
                                                 
30 We chose 180 stocks as the size of a sub-sample because it is approximately a tenth of the number of 
stocks, and is therefore roughly comparable to the number of stocks in a size decile. We present the 
principal component analysis of size deciles later in this section.  
31 We use simulations to create a benchmark because any arbitrary decision on the size of the sub-samples 
affects the estimates. For example, the percentage of the variance explained by the first principal 
component is at least 1% in a 100-stock sub-sample because each stock contributes one unit of variance to 
the analysis. The simulated benchmark helps us determine whether the structure observed in the data is 
really there, as opposed to being generated by our particular choices or simply by chance (see Freedman 
and Lane, 1983). 
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individual investors across stocks. Indeed, the first (and largest) principal component of 
ANIS explains only 1.33% of the variance (adjusted using the simulated data).  
Since some papers (e.g., Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler, 1991; Kumar and Lee, 2002) 
claim that “noise” trading of individuals is potentially stronger in small stocks, we sort 
the sample into ten deciles according to each stock’s average market capitalization over 
the sample period. Each decile contains less than 200 stocks, and therefore we do not 
need to draw random sub-samples to analyze the real data. Nonetheless, we still need to 
adjust the estimates using simulations of independent, normally-distributed data (details 
are provided in the Appendix). Panel B of Table 8 presents the results. Contrary to what 
one might have expected based on the above papers, the percentage of the ANIS variance 
explained by the first five principal components is lower for small stocks (3.20% for 
decile 1) than for large stocks (9.91% for decile 10).  
Our findings contrast with those of Kumar and Lee (2002) who examine 
correlations among order flow imbalances of stocks traded by clients of a single U.S. 
discount broker. They find that their measure of order flow imbalance is moderately 
correlated across stocks, concluding that there is evidence of a systematic component in 
retail investor trading.32 Our results indicate that it is difficult to find such correlated 
actions of individuals who trade on the NYSE. These results may suggest that finding a 
systematic influence of individual investor sentiment on expected returns may be 
difficult.  
 
6. Conclusions 
Our analysis of the trading of individual investors on the NYSE reveals that they behave 
as contrarians. The underlying reason for why individuals act in such a way is not well 
                                                 
32 Barber, Odean, and Zhu (2003) do not focus on the correlation in individual trading across many stocks, 
but they show that clients of two different brokers tend to trade the same stocks at the same time. They also 
show temporal persistence in that if individuals are buying a stock one month they are more likely to be 
buying it the following month as well.  
 27
understood, and one can find arguments in the behavioral literature supporting both 
contrarian tendencies (e.g., loss aversion in Odean, 1998) as well as a tendency to buy 
winners (e.g., positive feedback trading in De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann, 
1990b; attribution bias in Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam, 1998). Whatever the 
reason, the contrarian choices of individuals lead them to implicitly provide liquidity to 
other market participants who demand immediacy.  When large investors choose to 
accumulate shares, their buy orders push prices up inducing contrarian individuals to sell.  
Similarly, when large investors choose to sell shares, they push prices down and attract 
individual buyers. 
In theory, the extent to which price reversals are observed depends on the risk 
aversion of the liquidity providers and the amount of capital available for liquidity 
provision.  Suppose that individual investors are the only ones providing liquidity in the 
market. If contrarian individual investors are in some sense too active relative to the 
demand for immediacy, there will be an excess supply of liquidity in the market. If this is 
the case, then the contrarian individuals who implicitly provide liquidity will tend to lose 
money by trading with more informed investors at unfavorable terms.  On the other hand, 
if there are too few contrarian investors relative to the demand for immediacy, then those 
individuals who implicitly provide liquidity will realize excess returns.  
In reality, liquidity is provided by professional traders, (e.g., specialists) as well as 
contrarian individuals.  One would expect that the amount of capital that these 
professionals devote to their market making activity is determined by the aggregate 
demand for liquidity as well as the amount of liquidity implicitly supplied by individual 
investors.   In equilibrium, these professional traders will supply liquidity up to the point 
where their trading profits just cover their costs.  Over the past 20 years institutional 
trading has increased and the importance of individual investors has declined, suggesting 
that there may have been a positive shift in the demand for immediacy and a negative 
shift in the supply of liquidity.   If this is indeed the case, and if the amount of capital 
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devoted to liquidity provision is slow to adjust, then this shift could create a potential 
short-term profit opportunity for those potential traders that provide liquidity. 
The evidence in this paper is consistent with the view that in the recent period that 
corresponds to an increase in institutional trading, a short-term liquidity provider could 
have generated profits by mimicking the trades of individual investors.  There is also 
anecdotal evidence that suggests that in response to this opportunity, there has been an 
increase in the number of professional investors who specialize in short-term contrarian 
trading strategies, and thus indirectly provide such services.33  Indeed, the presence of 
these traders may be responsible for the reduction in the return reversals observed by 
Jegadeesh (1990) and Lehmann (1990).   
Then why don’t the strategies implemented by these short-term traders eliminate 
the excess returns associated with individual trades?  This is a difficult question that 
clearly warrants additional research.  The most natural explanation is that these high 
frequency strategies are quite costly to implement, so we expect to observe high pre-
transaction costs returns.  It is also possible that the remaining return is needed to 
compensate those firms for the added risk associated with undertaking the liquidity-
supplying trading strategies. Moreover, it may be the case that the mechanical strategies 
are unable to implement the strategies implicitly implemented by individual investors 
(the ANIS measure is not public information and institutions cannot simply use it to 
formulate their strategies). For example, in addition to buying past losers, our evidence 
suggests that individual investors tend to buy stocks that are temporarily more risky, 
                                                 
33 For example, Automated Trading Desk (ATD) is one of the firms that pioneered the use of computerized 
expert systems applied to liquidity provision. While today they also work on an agency basis for 
institutional investors, their core competency has been proprietary limit-order strategies that provide 
liquidity to the market and profit from short-term price movements. ATD trading in 2003 accounted for 
about 5% of Nasdaq volume and more than 2% of the volume in listed stocks.  It is also interesting to note 
that there has been a tremendous drive for consolidation among NYSE specialist firms in the past 15 years. 
The number of specialist firms trading NYSE common stocks declined from 52 in 1989 to seven in 2004. 
One argument made to support these consolidations was that liquidity will be enhanced by having better-
capitalized market making firms.  
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which might be difficult to implement with a purely mechanical strategy.  Perhaps 
institutions overreact to temporary increases in risk, and in doing so provide an 
opportunity for individual investors.  
The evidence we present seems to suggest that understanding short-horizon return 
predictability requires understanding the implicit liquidity provision of individuals as 
well as the explicit liquidity provision of professional investors. In particular, liquidity 
provision may be viewed as the interplay between different types of investors who 
populate the market. At the very least, our work suggests that understanding the behavior 
of one investor type, individuals, holds some promise for explaining observed return 
patterns. 
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Appendix 
Our sample consists of 1,920 stocks and 752 trading days. For the analysis in Panel A of 
Table 8 we first construct 1,000 random sub-samples of 180 stocks each from among the 
stocks that have a complete set of daily returns. We perform a principal component 
analysis using the Principal Axis method for each sub sample, and then compute the 
mean and standard deviation across the 1,000 sub-samples of the percentage of the 
variance explained by the first ten principal components. These summary statistics are 
reported in the panel as “Real Mean” and “Real Std”. 
The adjustment using simulations is done as follows. We construct another set of 
1,000 random sub-samples of 180 stocks each. We calculate the mean and standard 
deviation of the variable analyzed (say the sentiment of individual investors) for each 
stock in a sub-sample. We then generate an artificial time-series for each stock drawn 
from a normal distribution with the same mean and standard deviation. We conduct a 
principal component analysis on the 180 independent time-series and note the percentage 
of the variance explained by the first ten principal components. We repeat this process for 
each sub-sample ten times and average the percentage of the variance explained by each 
principal component in order to get estimates that are less noisy. We end up with 1,000 
estimates for sub-samples of simulated, independent data (reported in the table as Sim. 
Mean), and look at the differences (Diff.) between the real and simulated means. 
The results demonstrate the importance of considering a simulated benchmark. 
For example, the first principal component in Panel A explains on average 1.21% of the 
variance of the simulated, independent data. The fact that the first eigenvalue explains 
considerably more than 1/180 of the variance of a 180-stock sample of randomly 
generated returns is not entirely surprising. It is well known that the distribution of the 
spacing x between adjacent eigenvalues of a random matrix whose elements are i.i.d 
Gaussian is closely approximated by the “Wigner surmise” 2( ) BxP x Axe−≈ (see, for example, 
Porter, 1965). Furthermore, numerical experiments have shown that the surmise holds for 
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a wide range of distributions (e.g., Lehman, 2001). Therefore, the use of a simulated 
benchmark aids in evaluating the strength of the structure found in the real data.  
For the analysis in Panel B of Table 8 we sort the sample into ten deciles 
according to each stock’s average market capitalization over the sample period. We 
perform a principal component analysis on each decile separately. To create the 
simulated benchmark for these estimates we start by using the mean and standard 
deviation of each stock to generate 500 artificial time-series drawn from the normal 
distribution. We then use these simulated data to run 500 separate principal components 
analyses for each decile, and we report in the table the difference between the estimate of 
the percentage of variance in the real data and the mean of the 500 estimates of the 
simulated data.
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
 
The sample of stocks for the study consists of all common, domestic stocks that were traded on the NYSE 
at any time between January 1, 2000 and December 31, 2002 with records in the CRSP database. We use 
ticker symbol and CUSIP to match the stocks to a special dataset containing aggregated buying and selling 
volume of individuals and institutions that was provided to us by the NYSE. There are 1,920 stocks in our 
sample. From the CRSP database, AvgCap is the average monthly market capitalization of a stock over the 
sample period; AvgPrc is the average daily closing price; AvgTurn is the average weekly turnover (number 
of shares traded divided by the number of shares outstanding); and StdRet is the standard deviation of 
weekly returns. From the NYSE dataset we report the Dollar Volume, defined as the sum of executed buy 
and sell orders, and the Executed Order Size (in dollars and shares) of individual investors. We sort the 
stocks by market capitalization into ten deciles, and form three size groups: small stocks (deciles 1, 2, 3, 
and 4), mid-cap stocks (deciles 5, 6, and 7), and large stocks (deciles 8, 9, and 10). The summary statistics 
are presented for the entire sample and separately for the three size groups.  
 
 
   
AvgCap 
(in million $)
AvgPrc 
(in $) 
AvgTurn
(in %) 
StdRet 
(in %) 
Individuals 
Dollar 
Volume 
(1000s $) 
Individuals 
Executed 
Order Size 
(shares) 
All stocks  Mean  5,698.9 61.62 2.37 0.0735 4,775.5 799.8
  Median 941.2 22.31 1.96 0.0622 1,148.0 675.5
Small stocks  Mean  289.3 13.05 2.15 0.0881 656.9 948.1
  Median 271.7 10.97 1.43 0.0745 356.8 773.6
Medium stocks  Mean  1,283.5 25.81 3.08 0.0711 2,119.2 738.4
  Median 1,180.5 23.93 2.41 0.0623 1,388.3 645.4
Large stocks  Mean  15,001.4 140.65 3.05 0.0634 12,404.0 691.4
  Median 5,256.9 38.36 2.48 0.0566 5,223.2 634.5
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Table 2 
Returns around Individual Trading 
 
This table presents analysis of market-adjusted returns around intense buying and selling activity of individuals as given by the investor sentiment measure 
(ANIS). For each week in the sample period, we use the last 10 weeks (including the current week) to form ANIS deciles. Each stock is put into one of ten 
deciles according to the value of ANIS in the current week relative to its value in the previous ten weeks. Decile 1 contains the stocks with the most intense 
selling (negative ANIS) while decile 10 contains the stocks with the most intense buying (positive ANIS). In Panel A we present the results for four portfolios: (i) 
decile 1, (ii) deciles 1 and 2, (iii) deciles 9 and 10, and (iv) decile 10. Let k be the number of days prior to or following portfolio formation each week. We 
calculate eight cumulative return numbers for each of the stocks in a portfolio: CR(t-k,t-1) where k∈{20, 15, 10, 5} days and t is the first day of the formation 
week, and CR(t+1,t+k) where k∈{5, 10, 15, 20} days and t is the last day of the week. The return on each portfolio is then adjusted by subtracting the return on a 
market proxy (the value-weighted portfolio of all stocks in the sample). We present the time-series mean and t-statistic for each market-adjusted cumulative 
return measure. In Panel B we partition the sample each week into three groups according to the average percentage effective spread of the stocks. We then 
present the cumulative return results for the Intense Individual Buying portfolio (decile 10) of each spread group. ** indicates significance at the 1% level and * 
indicates significance at the 5% level (both against a two-sided alternative). 
 
Panel A: Returns around Individual Trading 
Portfolio  k=−20       k=−15 k=−10 k=−5 k=+5 k=+10 k=+15 k=+20
Intense Selling Mean  0.0397** 0.0374** 0.0302** 0.0192** -0.0014 -0.0013 -0.0006 0.0009 
(decile 1)  t-stat.         (13.42) (15.19) (15.80) (14.82) (-1.10) (-0.66) (-0.26) (0.32)
Selling  Mean  0.0373** 0.0342** 0.0277** 0.0171** -0.0016 -0.0016 -0.0011 0.006 
(deciles 1&2)          t-stat. (13.28) (14.59) (15.55) (14.38) (-1.37) (-0.91) (-0.48) (0.25)
Buying  Mean  -0.0258** -0.0249** -0.0208** -0.0138** 0.0032** 0.0066** 0.0096** 0.0134** 
(deciles 9&10)          t-stat. (-9.45) (-10.86) (-11.17) (-10.84) (2.76) (3.75) (4.34) (5.10)
Intense Buying  Mean  -0.0254** -0.0251** -0.0218** -0.0150** 0.0033** 0.0070** 0.0103** 0.0140** 
(decile 10)  t-stat.         (-9.21) (-10.67) (-11.27) (-11.33) (2.77) (3.89) (4.66) (5.37)
 
Panel B: Returns around Intense Individual Buying (decile 10) by Percentage Effective Spread Groups  
Spread Group  k=−20       k=−15 k=−10 k=−5 k=+5 k=+10 k=+15 k=+20
Small %EffSprd Mean  -0.0078** -0.0097** -0.0102** -0.0080** 0.0012 0.0036** 0.0054** 0.0090** 
 t-stat.         (-4.28) (-5.86) (-7.48) (-7.66) (1.23) (2.61) (3.70) (5.28)
Medium %EffSprd  Mean  -0.0238** -0.0240** -0.0210** -0.0146** 0.0036* 0.0085** 0.0118** 0.0153** 
 t-stat.         (-8.37) (-9.72) (-10.18) (-10.55) (2.56) (4.17) (4.57) (5.32)
Large %EffSprd  Mean  -0.0487** -0.0448** -0.0368** -0.0240** 0.0053* 0.0097** 0.0152** 0.0187** 
 t-stat.         (-8.77) (-9.41) (-9.55) (-9.45) (2.23) (2.66) (3.19) (3.34)
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 Table 3 
Return Volatility around Individual Trading 
 
This table presents analysis of daily standard deviation of returns around intense buying and selling activity of individuals as given by the investor sentiment 
measure (ANIS). For each week in the sample period, we use the last 10 weeks (including the current week) to form ANIS deciles. Each stock is put into one of 
ten deciles according to the value of ANIS in the current week relative to its value in the previous ten weeks. Decile 1 contains the stocks with the most intense 
selling (negative ANIS) while decile 10 contains the stocks with the most intense buying (positive ANIS). We present the results for four portfolios: (i) decile 1, 
(ii) deciles 1 and 2, (iii) deciles 9 and 10, and (iv) decile 10. For each stock and each week, we calculate the standard deviation of daily returns in a 9-day window 
centered on day k∈{-20, -15, -10, -5, 0, 5, 10, 15, 20}, where k = 0 is the middle of the formation week. We subtract from these numbers the “normal” 9-day 
return standard deviation (which we compute as the average of daily return standard deviations on all non-overlapping 9-day windows in the sample period). 
Every week we calculate the average of these standard deviations across all the stocks in each of the four portfolios. Each cell in the table contains the time-series 
mean for each portfolio and a t-statistic testing the hypothesis of a zero mean. The last three columns provide the differences in standard deviations from k = −20 
to k = 0, k = 0 to k = +20, and k = −20 to k = +20, with t-statistics testing the hypothesis of zero differences. ** indicates significance at the 1% level and * 
indicates significance at the 5% level (both against a two-sided alternative). 
 
 
Portfolio k = −20   k = −15 k = −10 k = −5 k = 0 k = +5 k = +10 k = +15 k = +20 k = −20 to k = 0 
k = 0 to  
k = +20 
k = −20 
to k=+20 
Intense Selling 
(decile 1) 
0.0000 
(-0.03) 
0.0000 
(-0.07) 
0.0000 
(0.04) 
0.0014** 
(2.62) 
0.0021** 
(4.14) 
0.0003 
(0.69) 
-0.0004 
(-0.80) 
-0.0006 
(-1.33) 
-0.0008 
(-1.52) 
0.0021** 
(3.63) 
-0.0029** 
(-4.41) 
-0.0007 
(-1.05) 
Selling  
(deciles 1&2) 
0.0001 
(0.24) 
0.0002 
(0.30) 
0.0003 
(0.56) 
0.0010 
(1.92) 
0.0010* 
(2.13) 
-0.0001 
(-0.20) 
-0.0005 
(-0.97) 
-0.0007 
(-1.45) 
-0.0007 
(-1.37) 
0.0009 
(1.56) 
-0.0017** 
(-2.72) 
-0.0008 
(-1.13) 
Buying 
(deciles 9&10) 
-0.0009 
(-1.90) 
-0.0009 
(-1.87) 
-0.0005 
(-0.99) 
0.0006 
(1.22) 
0.0015** 
(2.80) 
0.0009 
(1.84) 
0.0002 
(0.46) 
0.0002 
(0.33) 
0.0000 
(0.04) 
0.0024** 
(3.72) 
-0.0015* 
(-2.37) 
0.0009 
(1.34) 
Intense Buying 
(decile 10) 
-0.0012* 
(-2.40) 
-0.0011* 
(-2.36) 
-0.0007 
(-1.56) 
0.0011* 
(2.08) 
0.0027** 
(4.68) 
0.0015** 
(2.80) 
0.0004 
(0.86) 
0.0003 
(0.55) 
0.0001 
(0.21) 
0.0038** 
(5.72) 
-0.0026** 
(-3.92) 
0.0013 
(1.81) 
 
 39
Table 4 
Return Predictability: Portfolio Sorting Approach 
 
This table presents analysis of weekly return predictability conditional on the previous week’s return (Panel 
A) or turnover (Panel B) and the investor sentiment measure (ANIS). For each week in the sample period, 
we use the last 10 weeks (including the current week) to form ANIS quintiles. Each stock is put into one of 
the five quintiles according to the value of ANIS in the current week relative to its value in the previous 
nine weeks (where quintile 1 has stocks with more negative ANIS, or more selling, and quintile 5 has 
stocks with more positive ANIS, or more buying). In Panel A, each week in the sample period stocks are 
also sorted on return and put into five quintiles (quintile 1 has stocks with the most negative return and 
quintile 5 has stocks with the most positive return). We then form 25 portfolios as the intersection of the 
five return quintiles and five ANIS quintiles, and compute for each portfolio the market-adjusted return in 
the week following the formation week. We present the time-series mean return for each of the 25 
portfolios sorted by return and the sentiment of individual investors. The last two rows of the panel give the 
payoff to the strategy of buying ANIS quintile 5 and selling ANIS quintile 1, and the last two columns of 
the panel give the payoff to the strategy of buying return quintile 5 and selling return quintile 1. Panel B 
present similar analysis except that we sort on past turnover (rather than past return) and past ANIS. The 
construction of the 25 portfolios is analogous to the one in Panel A, and the last two columns of the panel 
give the payoff to the strategy of buying turnover quintile 5 and selling turnover quintile 1. ** indicates 
significance at the 1% level and * indicates significance at the 5% level (both against a two-sided 
alternative). The t-statistic is computed using the Newey-West correction. 
 
Panel A: Weekly Return Predictability using Past Return and ANIS 
 
                                          Return(t) 
  Q1 (<0) Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 (>0) Q5−Q1 t-statistic 
Q1 (<0) -0.0026 -0.0022 -0.0013 -0.0003 -0.0025 0.0001 -0.05 
Q2 -0.0012 -0.0011 -0.0007 -0.0009 -0.0034 -0.0022 0.95 
Q3 0.0003 -0.0019 -0.0002 0.0008 -0.0012 -0.0015 0.70 
Q4 0.0023 -0.0002 0.0013 0.0014 0.0006 -0.0017 0.80 
Q5 (>0) 0.0041 0.0011 0.0023 0.0027 0.0025 -0.0016 0.80 
Q5−Q1 0.0067** 0.0032** 0.0036** 0.0030** 0.0050**        
   
  A
N
IS
(t)
   
   
   
 
   
   
   
 
t-statistic 4.28 2.84 4.56 3.08 3.51   
 
Panel B: Weekly Return Predictability using Past Turnover and ANIS 
 
                                       Turnover(t) 
  Q1 (low) Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 (high) Q5−Q1 t-statistic 
Q1 (<0) -0.0050 -0.0029 -0.0022 -0.0006 0.0000 0.0052** 3.06 
Q2 -0.0040 -0.0039 -0.0021 0.0007 0.0008 0.0048** 3.49 
Q3 -0.0042 -0.0026 -0.0003 0.0007 0.0030 0.0072** 4.72 
Q4 -0.0029 -0.0006 0.0022 0.0039 0.0045 0.0074** 4.09 
Q5 (>0) 0.0011 0.0001 0.0005 0.0034 0.0058 0.0047** 2.65 
Q5−Q1 0.0063** 0.0030* 0.0027* 0.0040** 0.0058**       
   
  A
N
IS
(t)
   
   
   
 
   
   
   
 
t-statistic 3.68 2.51 2.55 2.92 3.91  
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Table 5 
Fama-MacBeth Approach with Dummy Variables for Past Return Quintiles 
 
This table presents a regression analysis of short-horizon (weekly) return predictability. The dependent 
variable is weekly return (from CRSP), Return(t+1), and the independent variables are an intercept, and a 
three sets of dummy variables. The first set is formed by sorting Return(t) into quintiles and using four 
dummy variables for quintiles 1 through 4. The second and third sets follow similar procedure for creating 
quintile dummy variables for the ANIS(t) and Turnover(t) variables. Construction of the individual investor 
sentiment measure (ANIS) is described in Section 2. We implement a Fama-MacBeth methodology for the 
regressions: (i) a cross-sectional regression is performed for each week in the sample period, and (ii) test 
statistics are based on the time-series of the coefficient estimates. We present the mean coefficient from the 
weekly regressions, and use the Newey-West correction for the standard errors to compute the t-statistics. 
We present results separately for all stocks and for three size groups. ** indicates significance at the 1% 
level and * indicates significance at the 5% level (both against a two-sided alternative). 
 
 
Variable All Stocks Small Stocks Mid-Cap Stocks Large Stocks 
Intercept 
(t-statistic) 
0.0070** 
(2.81) 
0.0063* 
(2.23) 
0.0077** 
(3.06) 
0.0071** 
(2.80) 
ANIS Q1 
(t-statistic) 
-0.0046** 
(-6.95) 
-0.0055** 
(-5.02) 
-0.0040** 
(-5.49) 
-0.0041** 
(-4.65) 
ANIS Q2 
(t-statistic) 
-0.0036** 
(-5.38) 
-0.0050** 
(-4.75) 
-0.0028** 
(-3.22) 
-0.0026** 
(-3.38) 
ANIS Q3 
(t-statistic) 
-0.0026** 
(-4.39) 
-0.0036** 
(-3.43) 
-0.0024** 
(-3.04) 
-0.0014 
(-1.76) 
ANIS Q4 
(t-statistic) 
-0.0011 
(-1.84) 
-0.0012 
(-1.11) 
-0.0017* 
(-1.99) 
-0.0005 
(-0.58) 
Turnover Q1 
(t-statistic) 
-0.0062** 
(-6.43) 
-0.0075** 
(-5.39) 
-0.0027* 
(-2.48) 
-0.0028* 
(-2.15) 
Turnover Q2 
(t-statistic) 
-0.0054** 
(-6.44) 
-0.0074** 
(-5.89) 
-0.0022* 
(-2.33) 
-0.0031** 
(-2.93) 
Turnover Q3 
(t-statistic) 
-0.0036** 
(-4.76) 
-0.0046** 
(-4.05) 
-0.0008 
(-1.06) 
-0.0030** 
(-3.00) 
Turnover Q4 
(t-statistic) 
-0.0018** 
(-2.75) 
-0.0021 
(-1.83) 
-0.0011 
(-1.38) 
-0.0013 
(-1.40) 
Return Q1 
(t-statistic) 
0.0017 
(1.17) 
0.0042** 
(2.89) 
-0.0018 
(-1.02) 
-0.0002 
(-0.07) 
Return Q2 
(t-statistic) 
0.0003 
(0.23) 
0.0006 
(0.45) 
-0.0004 
(-0.31) 
-0.0018 
(-1.10) 
Return Q3 
(t-statistic) 
0.0003 
(0.36) 
0.0014 
(1.28) 
-0.0007 
(-0.52) 
-0.0018 
(-1.29) 
Return Q4 
(t-statistic) 
0.0000 
(0.03) 
0.0016 
(1.54) 
-0.0018 
(-1.63) 
-0.0011 
(-1.04) 
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Table 6 
Fama-MacBeth Approach with Continuous Past Return Variable 
 
This table presents a regression analysis of short-horizon (weekly) return predictability. The dependent 
variable is weekly return (from CRSP), Return(t+1), and the independent variables are an intercept, 
Return(t), ANISDecile(t), and TurnoverDecile(t). The TurnoverDecile variable is from Gervais, Kaniel, 
and Mingelgrin (2001). It classifies the weekly turnover (number of shares traded over the number of 
shares outstanding) into ten deciles by comparing it to the same stock’s turnover in the previous nine 
weeks. The investor sentiment (ANIS) measure is described in section 2, and the ANISDecile variable is 
constructed in a similar fashion to TurnoverDecile. We implement a Fama-MacBeth methodology for the 
regressions: (i) a cross-sectional regression is performed for each week in the sample period, and (ii) test 
statistics are based on the time-series of the coefficient estimates. We present the mean coefficient from the  
weekly regressions, and use the Newey-West correction for the standard errors to compute the t-statistics. 
In Panel A we use CRSP returns, while in Panel B we compute returns using end-of-day quote midpoints 
from the TAQ database. ** indicates significance at the 1% level and * indicates significance at the 5% 
level (both against a two-sided alternative). 
 
Panel A: CRSP Returns 
Size Groups Intercept 
 
(t-statistic) 
Return(t) 
 
(t-statistic) 
ANISDecile(t) 
 
(t-statistic) 
Turnover 
Decile(t) 
(t-statistic) 
0.0021 -0.0243**   
(0.94) (-2.80)     
-0.0013  0.0006**  
(-0.60)   (7.55)   
-0.0029   0.0008** 
(-1.19)     (6.36) 
-0.0057* -0.0226** 0.0005** 0.0009** 
All Stocks 
(-2.44) (-2.62) (6.84) (7.29) 
0.0006 -0.0337**   
(0.24) (-3.55)    
-0.0038  0.0008**  
(-1.52)   (6.63)  
-0.0057*   0.0011** 
(-2.11)     (7.14) 
-0.0092** -0.0335** 0.0007** 0.0011** 
Small Stocks 
(-3.45) (-3.53) (5.73) (7.67) 
0.0033 -0.0068   
(1.47) (-0.59)     
0.0009  0.0005**  
(0.39)   (5.00)   
0.0016   0.0003** 
(0.66)     (2.68) 
-0.0010 -0.0038 0.0005** 0.0003** 
Mid-Cap 
Stocks 
(-0.43) (-0.33) (4.91) (2.84) 
0.0027 -0.0213   
(1.24) (-1.41)     
-0.0002  0.0005**  
(-0.08)   (4.44)   
-0.0003   0.0004** 
(-0.13)     (3.21) 
-0.0027 -0.0159 0.0005** 0.0005** 
Large Stocks 
(-1.10) (-1.04) (4.51) (3.85) 
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Panel B: Midquote Returns from the TAQ Database 
Size Groups Intercept 
 
(t-statistic) 
Return(t) 
 
(t-statistic) 
ANISDecile(t) 
 
(t-statistic) 
Turnover 
Decile(t) 
(t-statistic) 
0.0017 -0.0165*   
(0.80) (-2.02)     
-0.0015  0.0006**  
(-0.71)   (7.54)   
-0.0030   0.0008** 
(-1.23)     (6.39) 
-0.0058* -0.0148 0.0005** 0.0008** 
All Stocks 
(-2.49) -1.81 (7.17) (7.21) 
0.0003 -0.0218**   
(0.13) (-2.67)    
-0.0041  0.0007**  
(-1.64)   (6.70)  
-0.0057*   0.0010** 
(-2.12)     (7.71) 
-0.0093** -0.0215** 0.0007** 0.0010** 
Small Stocks 
(-3.48) (-2.64) (5.95) (8.20) 
0.0030 -0.0036   
(1.33) (-0.32)     
0.0007  0.0004**  
(0.33)   (4.74)   
0.0014   0.0003** 
(0.56)     (2.58) 
-0.0011 -0.0007 0.0004** 0.0003** 
Mid-Cap 
Stocks 
(-0.46) (-0.06) (4.73) (2.66) 
0.0023 -0.0185   
(1.07) (-1.22)     
-0.0005  0.0005**  
(-0.21)   (4.33)   
-0.0006   0.0004** 
(-0.25)     (3.12) 
-0.0030 -0.0132 0.0004** 0.0005** 
Large Stocks 
(-1.23) (-0.86) (4.48) (3.72) 
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 Table 7 
Return Predictability: Historical Trends 
 
This table presents an investigation of historical trends in short-horizon (weekly) return predictability with 
past return as the predictive variable. The dependent variable is weekly return (from CRSP), Return(t+1), 
and the independent variables are an intercept and Return(t). We implement a Fama-MacBeth methodology 
for the regressions: (i) a cross-sectional regression is performed for each week in the sample period, and (ii) 
test statistics are based on the time-series of the coefficient estimates. We present the mean coefficient from 
the weekly regressions, and use the Newey-West correction for the standard errors to compute the t-
statistics. Since our main analysis (e.g., Table 6) uses three years of data (2000-2002), we examine 
historical trends by running the regressions for non-overlapping three-year periods going back from 2002 to 
the beginning of data availability in CRSP. The table presents regression results for all stocks and by size 
groups. We sort stocks according to market capitalization into ten deciles, and define deciles 1, 2, 3, and 4 
as small stocks, deciles 5, 6, and 7 as mid-cap stocks, and deciles 8, 9, and 10 as large stocks. ** indicates 
significance at the 1% level and * indicates significance at the 5% level (both against a two-sided 
alternative). 
 
 All Stocks Small Stocks Mid-Cap Stocks Large Stocks 
 Intercept Return(t) Intercept Return(t) Intercept Return(t) Intercept Return(t) 
0.0026 -0.0777** 0.0034* -0.0916** 0.0023 -0.0778** 0.0019 -0.0528** 1964 – 
1966 (1.88) (-9.06) (2.12) (-9.66) (1.64) (-7.51) (1.51) (-5.52) 
0.0029 -0.0823** 0.0044* -0.0918** 0.0026 -0.0771** 0.0015 -0.0781** 1967 – 
1969 (1.65) (-12.40) (2.12) (-11.25) (1.47) (-9.84) (1.00) (-9.86) 
0.0017 -0.0884** 0.0014 -0.1162** 0.0019 -0.0685** 0.0023 -0.0653** 1970 – 
1972 (0.75) (-10.67) (0.51) (-13.08) (0.82) (-6.42) (1.16) (-7.50) 
0.0001 -0.1060** 0.0006 -0.1366** 0.0002 -0.0909** -0.0005 -0.0681** 1973 – 
1975 (0.04) (-12.87) (0.18) (-15.92) (0.06) (-9.43) (-0.18) (-6.49) 
0.0044* -0.0831** 0.0061** -0.0988** 0.0044* -0.0797** 0.0018 -0.0716** 1976 – 
1978 (2.48) (-10.45) (2.75) (-11.93) (2.56) (-8.95) (1.23) (-8.78) 
0.0039* -0.0690** 0.0046* -0.0800** 0.0039* -0.0715** 0.0030 -0.0554** 1979 – 
1981 (2.11) (-11.23) (2.26) (-13.10) (2.10) (-8.77) (1.70) (-5.58) 
0.0046* -0.0655** 0.0053** -0.0680** 0.0046* -0.0724** 0.0042* -0.0691** 1982 – 
1984 (2.42) (-12.00) (2.69) (-10.30) (2.32) (-9.34) (2.19) (-7.67) 
0.0031 -0.0735** 0.0021 -0.0802** 0.0035 -0.0750** 0.0043 -0.0739** 1985 – 
1987 (1.20) (-9.50) (0.73) (-9.05) (1.36) (-8.34) (1.86) (-6.82) 
0.0016 -0.0940** 0.0006 -0.1161** 0.0017 -0.0309** 0.0025 -0.0427** 1988 – 
1990 (0.98) (-6.21) (0.31) (-5.65) (1.02) (-3.37) (1.56) (-4.16) 
0.0056** -0.0791** 0.0068** -0.0948** 0.0051** -0.0517** 0.0043** -0.0511** 1991 – 
1993 (3.43) (-11.68) (3.06) (-10.49) (3.50) (-5.47) (3.45) (-5.98) 
0.0030** -0.0555** 0.0031* -0.0750** 0.0028* -0.0153* 0.0034** -0.0431** 1994 – 
1996 (2.69) (-9.40) (2.56) (-8.66) (2.37) (-2.05) (2.98) (-5.31) 
0.0023 -0.0401** 0.0015 -0.0469** 0.0024 -0.0182 0.0028 -0.0256* 1997 – 
1999 (1.13) (-4.78) (0.69) (-5.78) (1.12) (-1.16) (1.58) (-2.43) 
0.0016 -0.0243** 0.0018 -0.0393** 0.0022 0.0061 0.0012 -0.0120 2000 – 
2002 (0.77) (-2.95) (0.81) (-4.35) (1.04) (0.57) (0.56) (-0.75) 
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Table 8 
Principal Component Analysis 
 
This table presents a principal component analysis of returns and the investor sentiment measure of 
individuals (ANIS) at the daily frequency. Panel A reports the results of a principal component analysis of 
1,000 sub-samples of 180 stocks each (since we have more stocks in our sample than days in the sample 
period). We perform a principal component analysis on each sub-sample, and report the mean (Real Mean) 
and standard deviation (Real Std.) across sub-samples of the percentage of the variance explained by the 
first 10 principal components. We then construct 1,000 additional 180-stock random sub-samples. We 
compute for each stock the mean and standard deviation of the variable of interest (say ANIS of 
individuals) and generate an artificial time-series for each stock drawn from a normal distribution with the 
same mean and standard deviation. We perform a principal component analysis on the simulated data of 
each sub-sample, and report the mean (Sim. Mean) across sub-samples of the percentage of the variance 
explained by the first 10 principal components. We then report the difference in the percentage of the 
variance explained by the different principal components (PC1, PC2, sum of PC1-5, sum of PC1-10) 
between the real data and the simulated data. Panel B reports the results of a principal component analysis 
done separately on each size decile for ANIS of individuals and institutions. We sort the stocks according 
to average market capitalization over the sample period into 10 deciles. We perform a principal component 
analysis on each decile and report the percentage of the variance explained by both the first 5 and the first 
10 principal components (PC1-5 and PC1-10, respectively). We then use the mean and standard deviation 
of each stock to generate 500 artificial time-series drawn from the normal distribution to form 500 
independent sub-samples for each decile. We perform a principal component analysis on each sub-sample 
and save the mean across the sub-samples of the percentage of the variance explained by the first 5 and 10 
principal components. We then report the difference in the percentage of the variance explained by the 
principal components between the real data and the simulated data. 
 
Panel A: Percentage of Variance Explained by Principal Components (1000 random samples of 180 stocks) 
 
  PC1 PC2 PC1-5 PC1-10 
Returns Real Mean 0.1330 0.0295 0.2189 0.2807 
 Real Std. 0.0081 0.0030 0.0099 0.0101 
 Sim. Mean 0.0121 0.0118 0.0580 0.1119 
 Diff. 0.1209 0.0177 0.1609 0.1688 
ANIS Real Mean 0.0254 0.0217 0.0967 0.1642 
 Real Std. 0.0020 0.0015 0.0037 0.0044 
 Sim. Mean 0.0121 0.0118 0.0580 0.1119 
 Diff. 0.0133 0.0099 0.0386 0.0523 
 
Panel B: Percentage of Variance Explained by Principal Components (size deciles) 
 
  Decile 
1 
(small) 
Decile 
2 
Decile 
3 
Decile 
4 
Decile 
5 
Decile 
6 
Decile 
7 
Decile 
8 
Decile 
9 
Decile 
10 
(large) 
PC Real  0.0880 0.0903 0.0838 0.0840 0.0889 0.0989 0.1026 0.1017 0.1144 0.1550 
1-5 Diff. 0.0320 0.0343 0.0278 0.0280 0.0330 0.0429 0.0465 0.0457 0.0583 0.0991 
PC Real  0.1572 0.1570 0.1483 0.1509 0.1550 0.1629 0.1677 0.1675 0.1808 0.2266 
1-10 Diff. 0.0491 0.0489 0.0402 0.0428 0.0472 0.0548 0.0596 0.0594 0.0727 0.1188 
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